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ABSTRACT
I consider a noncooperative game between rival governments where the strategic
variable is an export subsidy. Governments can choose their policy level
either prior to observing the random, demand intercept or subsequent to this
observation. It is assumed that a policy choice made ex ante is completely
irreversible ex post. I show that the resulting equilibrium will frequently
involve asymmetric timing of policy choice. One government will move first
and, in effect, become the leader in the trade-policy game. The other
government will delay its commitment, thereby better tailoring its policy to
the actual economic environment. Equilibrium with asymmetric timing of
commitment exists when there is not too much noise in the system or, even in
the large noise case, when the number of firms differs across countries. When
there are two such equilibria, one of these equilibria may be focal, i.e., the
governments might agree on which should be the leader. In the large noise
case, the equilibrium with asymmetric timing of commitment is the unique
equilibrium of the overall game.

I. Introduction
Export subsidies pose an enigma for economic theory. Within the
traditional small country (competitive) and large country (monopoly)
paradigms of international trade, no economic rationale for export
subsidies exists. Since these models account for both extremes in
market structure, one may wonder whether it is possible to rationalize
export subsidies on the basis of domestic Pareto improvement. Yet, as
demonstrated in the seminal paper by Brander and Spencer (1985) , an
export subsidy can be explained by a "profit shifting" motive which
emerges when the industry in question is oligopolistic.
Brander and Spencer consider a two stage game where, in stage one,
rival governments choose their trade policies and then, in stage two,
producers in each country choose their strategic variables given the
joint trade policy choice of the rival governments made in the previous
stage. In analogy to the capacity investment by an incumbent firm,
e.g., Dixit (1980), an export subsidy by the domestic government shifts
the reaction function of the domestic industry, thereby moving the
resulting equilibrium along the foreign country's reaction function.
When the domestic industry is characterized by single firm
operation, the effect of an export subsidy on domestic profits via the
direct effect on the domestic industry is negligible, to a first order
approximation, because the' domestic industry was already maximizing
profits prior to the subsidy. However, such a subsidy significantly
An alternate, readily available explanation is that export subsidies are a form of
patronage to the targeted domestic industry and result even if some other sector of
the economy suffers. The recent Japanese experience suggests otherwise. Moreover,
even if export subsidies are nothing but patronage, it is still a mystery why export
subsidies rather than some other form of patronage result when so much of the benefit
from an export subsidy is captured by importing countries.
affects domestic profits via its affect on the actions taken by foreign
producers. In the case of Cournot competition in the product market, an
export subsidy increases the market share of the domestic producer while
lowering the product price. * Then, a small export subsidy raises
domestic profits while lowering overall industry profits, since the
Stackelberg leadership output exceeds the Cournot output; ergo, profit
shifting.
Though export subsidies might emerge in an equilibrium when rival
governments compete over their trade policies, it is not necessarily the
case that subsidies will result from such government competition.
Indeed, it is possible that export taxes are the outcome. This is the
point of the paper by Eaton and Grossman (1986)
.
To understand why this is the case, first suppose the Cournot
assumption is maintained but allow any prespecified number of firms to
operate in either country. As the domestic industry gets less
concentrated, the domestic reaction function shifts outward. If the
domestic industry is sufficiently competitive, the "cartelization"
motive will dominate the profit shifting motive and the optimal policy
for the domestic government will be a tax rather than a subsidy.
Second, suppose the assumption concerning single firm operation in each
country is maintained but firms produce imperfect substitutes and are
Bertrand competitors choosing price rather than Cournot competitors
choosing quantity. Again, an export tax is optimal as such a tax will
encourage a higher foreign price. In general, the optimal policy will
depend on industry concentration as well as on whether domestic and
2
I am assuming that revenue and cost functions satisfy standard convexity conditions
and also that there is a unique equilibrium which is stable.
foreign firms compete in strategic substitutes or strategic complements.
(See Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985).)
An alternate critique of the Brander and Spencer approach has been
offered by Cooper and Riezman (1989) . These authors are concerned with
the arbitrary restriction to a linear tax or subsidy. Nonlinear
policies also have the effect of shifting reaction functions. But if
nonlinear policies are allowed in the first stage of the game, a
plethora of equilibria results. There does not appear to be a
compelling way to make an equilibrium selection in this case.
Cooper and Riezman suggest a way out of this dilemma. They allow
for some actual uncertainty which is unresolved until after governments
have committed to their policy choices. Then, a policy must be
evaluated on the basis of how it performs for all realizations of the
underlying random variable rather than on just how it performs when this
random variable takes on its expected value. Policies which perform
badly as the environment changes slightly are ruled out and the set of
equilibria is reduced.
One possible way to proceed at this juncture is to maintain the
two stage structure and, following Weitzman (1974), allow governments to
choose arbitrary nonlinear incentive schemes in the first stage.
Klemperer and Mayer (1989) take this type of an approach in an oligopoly
model where the firm commits itself ex ante to a supply function and ex
post chooses a point along this supply function. In the trade context,
it seems unreasonable to assume that governments can directly choose an
aggregate supply function for their domestic producers, at least when
there is more than one firm. But, in a model where the government
chooses a unit subsidy which depends on aggregate output, difficulties
are created owing to intractability, lack of realism, and nonexistence
of equilibrium. ^ As a consequence, Cooper and Riezman offer a highly
stylized model where it is assumed that the only nonlinear, admissible
policy is a fixed quantity regime.
Fixed quantity policies are completely inflexible in the face of
uncertainty and would never emerge in the equilibrium of a two stage
game. Cooper and Riezman consider a three stage game, where governments
announce their policy type in the first stage, either tax-subsidy or
fixed-quantity, and choose their policy level in the second stage, given
their first stage policy type choice. Consideration of this three
stage game introduces a new wrinkle. The stage one policy type choice
can affect the rival government's stage two policy level choice. Then,
a fixed-quantity policy may be attractive because, by adopting such a
policy in stage one, the government immunizes its country from the rival
government's profit shifting in the ensuing subgame. Since a tax-
subsidy policy allows firms to better approximate the ex post optimum,
a tradeoff is created between being immune to the rival government's
profit shifting, on the one hand, or being vulnerable to profit shifting
but being flexible in the face of (demand) uncertainty, on the other.
The optimal choice depends on the noisiness of the system. Following
Jones and Ostroy (1985) , Cooper and Riezman show that in the low noise
case the equilibrium yields an inflexible fixed-quantity regime while in
the high noise case a more flexible tax-subsidy regime emerges.
3 As pointed out by Myerson (1982), existence of equilibrium is problematic in such an
unrestricted environment. Fershtman and Judd (1987) offer these existence problems as
justification for looking at linear incentive schemes.
Spencer and Brander (1989) analyze this type of extensive form in an oligopoly model
and provide a variety of interesting applications for this structure.
While the tradeoff between commitment and flexibility in trade
policy is an important one, it is not obvious that this tradeoff is
modelled best via a choice of policy type. Nor is it obvious that
governments are capable of temporally separating their choice of policy
type from their choice of policy level. In other words, it might be
more appropriate to collapse the first two stages of the Cooper and
Riezman model into a single stage.
One interpretation for this temporal separation in decision is
that government is hierarchical and different individuals in the
hierarchy are making the moves at the different stages. Higher ups
commit to a general policy type in stage one while lower level
appointees pursue the policy level choice in stage two.^ This
interpretation has immediate plausibility. Yet even this interpretation
does not produce the Cooper and Riezman extensive form unless it is also
assumed that the rival government can observe the internal, policy type
directive at the time this decision is made. If, instead, the rival
government can only observe an actual policy level decision, their model
collapses into a two stage model.
An alternate, and perhaps more natural way to model the commitment
versus flexibility tradeoff is to posit a fixed policy type but allow
governments to determine the frequency with which policy levels are
adjusted. The more' frequent the adjustment, the more flexible the
policy. This is the approach taken in my model. The motive for
adjusting policy is that governments learn about the economic
I am indebted to James Brander for providing this interpretation to me.
environment and can base their policy choice on what they have learned.
For simplicity, the three stage structure is maintained.
As in the Cooper and Riezman model, the first two stages of my
model are reserved for government decisions. In the first stage, each
government either chooses a tax-subsidy policy or opts to delay this
choice until the second stage. Between the first and second stage some
information about the economic environment becomes known to the
governments. If a government did not select a policy in stage one, it
must do so in stage two. It is assumed, however, that if a government
has selected a policy in stage one, this choice cannot be altered in
stage two, regardless of what the government learns about the economic
environment. ' In stage three, domestic and foreign producers play a
Cournot quantity game, as in the Cooper and Riezman model.
The primary consequence from adopting this alternative extensive
form is that the nature of the equilibrium changes . In equilibrium of
the Cooper and Riezman model, both governments adopt inflexible, fixed-
quantity policies in the low noise case. In contrast, there does not
exist an equilibrium of my model where both governments make the
relatively rigid decision to commit to a tax-subsidy scheme in stage
Q
one. This follows because it is strictly dominant for at least one of
An important question which is not considered in the paper is how governments
credibly commit to a rigid policy when such a policy is not optimal ex post. In the
paper, it is merely assumed that governments have such a commitment capability.
More realistically, committing to a policy in stage one imposes an adjustment cost
in stage two that could have been foregone were the government to delay its policy
choice. In the paper I restrict attention to the infinite adjustment cost case.
This type of equilibrium does exist if, with probability one, governments learn
nothing about the economic environment between stages one and two.
the governments to delay its policy choice till stage two given that its
rival has chosen a policy in stage one.
In the low noise case there are typically two equilibria of my
model. In such an equilibrium one government acts like a Stackelberg
leader by choosing its policy in stage one while the other government
acts like a Stackelberg follower by choosing its policy in stage two.
One of these equilibria may be focal in that it Pareto Dominates the
other equilibrium. I" Note that this Stackelberg outcome occurs in spite
of the fact that neither government has a first mover advantage. * In
this respect my model is similar to the model of Green and Sa danand
(1990) who consider endogenous Stackelberg leadership in oligopoly.
However, my model differs from those mentioned above in its
prediction for the high noise case. In these other models, all the
players adopt more flexible policies when the environment is
sufficiently noisy. In contrast, it is possible for there to be a
unique equilibrium of my model in the high noise case and this
equilibrium entails leadership on the part of one of the two
governments. This occurs when the follower government's tax-subsidy
policy is negatively correlated with the underlying uncertainty. Then,
the leader government encourages both its firms and the firms in the
other country to adjust to uncertainty by allowing greater variability
9 Weak dominance is obvious because in stage two each government could always choose
the policy it would have chosen in stage one. Strict dominance for at least one
government occurs because for this government the second stage best response is not
constant in the underlying uncertainty.
This result contrasts with the finding of Dowrick (1986) . In his model either
both players prefer to be the leader or both prefer to be the follower.
Arvan (1985) demonstrates a similar result in a two-period duopoly model with
inventories
.
in the follower government's policy response. This is achieved by the
leader government adopting an inflexible policy.
II . The Model
Following Riezman and Cooper, consider the market for a
homogeneous good which is produced by a relatively small number of
firms, F, and consumed by a large group of consumers. N. of the firms
operate in country 1 and N_ of the firms operate in country 2. (Hence,
F = N. + N_
.
) Assume that the number and location of the firms is
fixed. Each firm is assumed to operate at constant marginal cost. This
marginal cost is given by c, for firms in country 1 and by c
2
for firms
in country 2. That is, cost functions across firms are identical within
a country. Let p denote the product price. Then, the profit for a firm
which operates in country i and produces q. units of output is given by
(1) n
{
= (p - c.)qi ,
for i = 1,2.
As is now common in this literature, it is assumed that consumers
reside in a third country. This assumption is made so that governments
can pursue profit shifting and cartelization motives without having to
be concerned with the welfare of their consumers. For simplicity,
assume that the market demand curve is linear with random intercept.
The inverse demand curve is given by
(2) p = a + 9 - bQ,
where Q is total output, a and b are parameters with a,b > 0, and 9 is a
random variable with zero mean and finite, nonzero variance. Let a
denote the ex post value of the demand intercept; a = a + 9.
Suppose the government in country i institutes a per unit
production subsidy equal to s. and suppose that all firms engage in a
Cournot output game. It is assumed that firms know the realization of
the random demand intercept when playing this game. Then, the typical
firm in country i solves the following problem
(3) maximize (a - bQ, - bq - c. + s.)q,
q
where Q denotes the aggregate output of all other firms. This yields
the following output reaction function for a firm in country i
r
a - bQ - c. + s.
(4) q, = ^ ^ .12
It is straightforward to derive the aggregate output, country
reaction function from the above assuming the firms in country i have
achieved Cournot equilibrium. Since each firm in country i produces the
same output in Cournot equilibrium, this equilibrium condition is given
by Q
a
= (U^ - Dq^^ + Q., where Q. is the aggregate output of firms in the
country other than i. Then, we have
(5) qi-
=
(N. + l)b ttt " bQ J " °i + S i ] ^
Q. ~ [a - bQ . - c. + s.i = n.q.v i (n. + i)b J i i i^i
12 It is assumed that parameter values are restricted so as to always yield an
interior solution.
It is convenient to think of the number of firms in country i as
determining the slope of country i's output reaction function. This
slope moves from - 1/2 to - 1 as N. moves from 1 to *>, Then, it is
convenient to think of the unit subsidy in country i as a shifter of the
reaction function intercept.
It is also straightforward to derive the overall Cournot
* *
equilibrium. The equilibrium country outputs, Q, and Q- , are given by
(6) Qi = (F !
1
l)b [Ct + (N ^ + 1] (S i " °i ) ' *V S D ' C : )]
for i f j = 1,2; i * j. Then, the equilibrium price, p*, is given by
a - n ( 3l - Cl )
- N
2 o 2 - c 2 )
(7) P* - FT1 •
Finally, it is assumed that there are no distortions created in raising
the revenue to finance the subsidies, i.e., in accounting for aggregate
profit subsidies can be ignored. Then, the equilibrium country profits,
n
i
and n_, are given by
N
i
(8) n. = *—y" [a + (N. + l)s. - (N. + l) Ci - N.(s. - c.)]
(F + 1) b
X [a - N
i s i
- (N. + l)c
i
- N.(s. - c.)]
for i,j = 1,2; i * j, where Il i = (p* - c i )Q i .
Consider the following three stage game which is designed to
capture strategic competition between governments. In stage one the
government in country i chooses an indicator variable, d
i ,
and a unit
subsidy, 3^,. Here, d. denotes whether the government in country i
commits to a policy, d. - 1, or defers its policy choice until stage
two, d
i
- 0, while Si, is the unit subsidy that is in effect in country
11
i if the government has committed to a policy in stage one. Governments
are ignorant of the realization of 9 in stage one though its
distribution is common knowledge. Governments are assumed to move
simultaneously in this stage.
Between stage one and stage two governments get to observe 8. If
the government of country i has not committed to a policy in stage one,
it chooses a unit subsidy in stage two, 3 i?' on t ^ie Das i s of its
observation of and its knowledge of the play in stage one. For
analytic convenience, it is assumed that governments make a stage two
move in all cases. Then, a strategy for the government in country i is
2 3
a
i ,
where a
i
= (mil ,mi2 ), mL1 e {0,1} X9t,, and mi2 e {0,1} X <R -»SR.
That is, m^ - (di ,s il ) and m.- (m. 1 ,ia..,0) = s i2 . Governments are also
assumed to move simultaneously in this stage. After play in both stage
one and stage two has been completed, the unit subsidy that is in effect
in country i, s if is given by s.^ = dis il + (1 - di )s i2 .
In stage three, firms choose output. This stage has been
described extensively above. Indeed, (6) readily yields the equilibrium
of the third stage subgame . In this subgame the equilibrium output of
*
each firm in country i is Q. /N. . It is assumed that the government of
country i is interested in maximizing the expected aggregate profits of
the firms located in country i. Then, (8) along with the distribution
over 9 induces a map from joint strategies into joint expected profits.
III. The Stage Two Subgame
Suppose the government in country i has set d. = in stage one.
an.
From (8) and the first order condition, t— = 0, one obtains the stage
as.
two, tax-subsidy reaction function
12
(9)
r
_
1
S i " 2N.CNJ J-J-
[N. + 1 - N.] [a - (N. + l)c. - N.( Sj - C.)]
for i, j = 1,2; i * j. From (9) it is easy to obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 1: sign t— = - sign -r— . Moreover,
Bs
T
.
5-* < when N. < N. + 1.
ds. i J
= when ^ = N. + 1, and
> when N
i
> N. + 1.
Finally, when N
i
= N. + 1, s.^ 0, i.e., it is optimal for the
government to pursue a laissez-faire policy regardless of the demand
shock or the policy in country j.
Since the slope of the tax-subsidy reaction function plays such an
important role in the later analysis, it is appropriate to provide some
insight into the determinants of this slope. Some intuition is provided
by an examination of figure 1.
In the figure there are two output reaction functions for country
2, Q 2 I s 2 anc* $2 ' s 2 w ^-tn s 2 < s 2 ' anc* an outPut reaction function for
country 1, Q 1 . The subsidy level in country 1 that determines Q,, s,,
is such that s
1
= s^Sj). This can be seen by noting that l's isoprofit
curve through the Cournot country outputs, point A, is tangent to 2's
output reaction function. ^ now consider the (undrawn) isoprofit curve
for 1 which is tangent to Q_ |
s
2
. If the tangency point happens to be at
Recall that these unit subsidies shift the output reaction function but are not
counted in the profit calculation. Hence, l's isoprofit curve need not be horizontal
where it crosses l's reaction function, as must be the case when s. = 0.
13
B, then l's tax-subsidy reaction function is perfectly inelastic. If
r 1
the tangency point is to the right of B along Q 2 ls 2 , then l's tax-
subsidy reaction function is upward sloping. That is, it is necessary
to shift l's output reaction function upwards to obtain the tangency
point as the equilibrium of the third stage subgame. Similarly, the
tax-subsidy reaction function is downward sloping when the tangency
r 1
point is to the left of B along Q_ |
s
2
.
Recall that the number of firms in country 1 affects the slope of
country l's output reaction function. As N., increases, country l's
output reaction function through A gets flatter and the point B moves to
the left along Q 2 ls 2 .^
4 But, the number of firms in country 1 does not
affect the shape of the isoprofit curves.^ The tangency points remain
unchanged as H
1
increases. Consequently, for small values of N
1
the
tangency is to the left of B while for large values of N
1
the tangency
is to the right of B. This explains why the slope of the tax-subsidy
reaction function depends on the relative number of firms in the two
countries.
14 As N^ increases, the subsidy needed to sustain point A as the Nash equilibrium of
the third stage subgame also changes.
This is a consequence of the constant marginal cost assumption. If firm costs were
strictly convex, this conclusion would be invalid.
14
Figure 1
Given (9) , it is a simple matter to compute the Nash equilibrium
subsidies. The Nash equilibrium policy levels of the stage two subgame
* *
without prior government commitment are s, and s
2
where
(10) s i " a, (F + 3)
[N
D
+ X " N i ] [0t " (Ni + 2)C i + (Ni + 1)C J ]
for i,j = 1,2; i * j. Under the reasonable economic condition that the
second square bracketed term in (10) is positive, i.e., that the demand
intercept is sufficiently large relative to marginal cost, it follows
from (10) that the cartelization motive is never dominant in the country
with the more concentrated industry and is dominant in the country with
the less concentrated industry only when | N.^ - N . | > 1. Even in this
case, the overall effect is to depress price unless costs are much
higher in the country with the more concentrated industry. Moreover,
price is made less variable, regardless of cost differentials. This can
be seen by substituting the equilibrium policy levels from (10) into
(6), talcing the resulting quantities, and substituting into (7). The
price that results from the Nash equilibrium policies, p**, is given by
15
a + (N
2
+ l)c
1
+ (N
x
+ l)c
2(id p** = irfl
This price can be contrasted to the Cournot equilibrium price in the
absence of any government interference. This latter price is readily
obtained from (7) by setting s
1
= s
2
= 0.
In the ensuing section I consider the decision to commit to a
policy in stage one or delay the policy choice until stage two. As the
benchmark against which commitment can be judged, consider the expected
payoff from choosing to delay given that the rival government has also
chosen to delay. To do so, first consider the equilibrium payoffs in
the second stage subgame without prior government commitment. These
payoffs are obtained by substituting the equilibrium policy levels from
(10) into (8) to yield
(12) n* = r- [N. + 1] [a - (N. + 2)c. + (N. + l)c.]
2
(F + 3) b
for i, j = 1,2; i * j. Then, taking expectations with respect to
yields
(13) E
e
n* = r- [N. + 1] { [a - (N. + 2)0, + (N. + l)c.]
2
+ Var 6 }
(F + 3) b U
for i,j = 1,2; i * j.
IV. Commitment Versus Delay and Optimal Commitment
In this section I focus on the stage one decision by the
government of country i. Since governments are assumed to move
simultaneously in stage one, the government of country i cannot base its
stage one decision on having observed m.. For the remainder of this
section, let m. denote the government of country i's point expectation
as to the play that the government of country j will pursue in stage
one.
Case 1; Commitment By the Rival Government
r
From (9) , s» when N. + 1 = N. . In this case, the government of
country i can duplicate its optimal stage two decision by committing to
a laissez-faire policy in stage one. Moreover, it is evident that this
constitutes the optimal stage one commitment. Hence, the government of
country i is indifferent to committing or delaying in this case given
r
that d . = 1 . In all other cases, s. is not constant. Thus, when d. =
1, delay is strictly preferred to commitment for the government of
country i, since for every realization of 8 s. outperforms any fixed
policy that might be chosen before is observed, unless this policy
happens to coincide with s..
Case 2; Delay By the Rival Government
When d. = and N. * N. + 1, the government of country i knows
that it can affect the unit subsidy chosen by the government of country
j, since s. is not constant in this case. Hence, if the government of
country i chooses to commit to a policy in stage one, it will do so like
a Stackelberg leader in the tax-subsidy game played between the rival
governments.
In order to facilitate the intuition of the reader in
understanding case 2, I first consider the case where Var is very
small and provide a graphical analysis which is conducted assuming Var
= 0. Without loss of generality, take U, > N_ in what follows.
Subcase 1; Downward Sloping React ion Functions
When N
x
= N
2
the tax-subsidy reaction functions are downward
sloping for both governments. In this case, Stackelberg leadership
17
entails increasing the subsidy beyond the level that would obtain in the
equilibrium of the stage two subgame without prior commitment. Since
along j's tax-subsidy reaction function II. is diminishing in s^,
leadership in this case entails additional profit shifting. Either
government may emerge the leader.
Leadership point with
government 1 as the leader
Figure 2
Subcase 2: Natural Follower and Leader
When N
1
= N
2
+ 1 the tax-subsidy reaction function of the
government in country 1 is perfectly inelastic. In this case, the
Stackelberg solution of the tax-subsidy game with country 2 as the
leader coincides with the equilibrium of the stage two subgame without
prior commitment. That is, the government of country 2 is indifferent
to committing in stage one or delaying until stage two. Then, by
introducing the least bit of noise into the model, the government of
country 2 prefers to delay. Hence, there does not exist an equilibrium
of the model where the government of country 2 is the leader. However,
there is an equilibrium where the government of country 1 institutes a
positive subsidy in stage one so as to reduce the subsidy level
instituted by the government of country 2 in stage two.
18
Leadership point with government
2 as the leader coincides with Nash
lilibrium of the stage 2 subgame
Leadership point with
government 1 as the leader
Figure 3
Subcase 3; Cooperative Follower and Leader
When N
l
> N
2
+ 1 the tax-subsidy reaction function of the
government in country 1 is upward sloping. In this case, there are two
candidates for Stackelberg equilibrium and they may be Pareto ranked!
When the government of country 2 is the leader it reduces its subsidy
from the level that would obtain in the equilibrium of the stage two
subgame without commitment. Thus, both countries benefit from country
2*s commitment relative to the no commitment case. Indeed, the
government of country 1 may prefer to be the follower than to be the
leader. This occurs if l's isoprofit curve through 2's leadership point
does not cross 2's reaction function. When this is the case, one might
argue that leadership by 2 is focal.
19
Leadership point with
government 2 as the leader
is focal Nash equilibrium
Leadership point with
government 1 as the leader
Figure 4
Increasing the Noise of the Demand Intercept
The above graphical analysis is valid when Var 9=0 and remains
IF
valid for Var 9 small, since EqFI . | (s. = s.(s.)) is continuous in Var 9.
For larger values of Var 9, delay may become a more attractive option.
s
Let Sj^ denote the optimal tax-subsidy choice for the government of
country i in stage one given that the government of country j has
decided to delay its policy choice until stage 2. Note that Sj^ is the
Stackelberg leadership point for government i in the induced policy
game, i.e., s
i
is independent of Var 9, because of the linear-quadratic
structure of the model.
The graphical analysis remains valid as long as
(14) E
e
n.i (s. = s', Sj = Sj(s")) > E
e
n*
for some i, j =1,2; j * i. From (8) and (9) it follows that
20
r
N i
(15) EQlI.Ms.fSj = s.(s.)) = h(s.) + i 2 Var '
4(N
i
+ 1)
for some function h. From (13) it follows that
(16) E
e
n* = k. + —r- [N. + 1] Var 9,
(F + 3) b
for some constant k. . Thus, when
1 N
(17) z- [N, + 1] > i2 L j J 2 '
(F + 3) b 4 (Nt + 1)
for i, j = 1,2; j * i, it must be that when Var 9 is sufficiently large
the perfect equilibrium of the game entails both governments delaying
their policy choice. Note, however, that these conditions can only be
satisfied when N, = N
2
. In all other cases, the overall equilibrium
necessarily entails some government committing to its policy choice in
stage one. In other words, except in the case where countries have the
same number of firms, this model predicts a leader-follower relationship
between governments. Also note that when (17) is not satisfied for some
i, this same i is the leader in the focal equilibrium of the policy game
without uncertainty.
The intuition behind this observation is that when i is the
leader in the focal equilibrium, j s tax-subsidy reaction function is
negatively correlated with the random, demand intercept. In this case,
the government of country i actually increases the variability of the
product price by committing to a policy in stage one. Though the
variability of country i's aggregate output falls as a result of such a
commitment, the covariance between price and country i's aggregate
output rises, i.e., expected profits rise as well.
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The previous discussion is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 : The nature of perfect equilibria for the three stage
policy game depends on the difference, N
1
- N
2 ,
and on Var 9. The
perfect equilibrium correspondence is described below.
a) When N., = N_, there exists y such that for Var 9 < y there are two
equilibria of the overall game. In the first of these equilibria, the
government of country 1 commits to a policy in stage one while the
government of country 2 delays its policy choice until stage two. In
the second of these equilibria, the leader and follower roles are
reversed. There exists v, y_ < v, such that if Var 9 > y_ there is a
unique equilibrium of the overall game. In this equilibrium both
governments delay their policy choice until stage two. If y < v, there
is also a unique equilibrium when y < Var 9 < v. In this equilibrium,
one of the governments commits to a policy choice in stage one.
b) When N. « N. + 1, there is a unique equilibrium of the overall
game. In this equilibrium the government of country i commits to a
policy choice in stage one while the government of country j delays its
policy choice until stage two.
c) When N
i
> N. + 1, there exists v* such that for Var 9 < v* there
are two equilibria of the overall game. In the first of these
equilibria, the government of country 1 commits to a policy in stage one
while the government of country 2 delays its policy choice until stage
two. In the second of these equilibria, the leader and follower roles
are reversed. Here, in contrast with (a) , the equilibrium where the
government of country i commits to its policy in stage one may be focal.
When Var 9 > v*, there is a unique equilibrium of the overall game where
the government of country i commits to its policy in stage one .
V. Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that a critical issue in understanding
the strategic interplay between rival governments competing in trade
policy is the timing of government commitments. When governments are
capable of adjusting the flexibility of their policies, the outcome is
likely to be asymmetric in the sense that one government will adopt a
rigid policy with strong commitment power while its rival will adopt a
more flexible policy which responds better in a changing economic
environment. The model predicts this asymmetric outcome except in the
case of high noise and an equal number of firms in both countries.
Two results were obtained in analyzing the stage two subgame that
seem worthy of some additional comment. When the number of firms in
country 1 differs significantly from the number of firms in country 2,
it was shown that the tax-subsidy reaction function for the country with
the less concentrated industry is upward sloping. In addition, this
tax-subsidy reaction function is negatively correlated with the demand
shock. It is worth asking whether these results are robust to more
general demand and cost structures.
First, observe that these two results are adjuncts when there is a
unique Cournot equilibrium of the third stage subgame and this
equilibrium is stable. Second, recall that when viewing these results
in the joint output space, the crucial determinant was the slope of the
locus of tangencies between i's isoprofit curves and j's reaction
functions, on the one hand, and the slope of i's reaction function, on
the other hand.
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In the analysis provided in the paper, i's isoprofit curves were
unaffected by a change in the number of firms operating in country i,
because of the constant marginal cost assumption. Were firms to operate
under rising marginal cost, these isoprofit curves would be affected by
such a change. The resulting shift in isoprofit curves would tend to
support the conclusions of the paper even when demand is nonlinear, as
long as the standard assumptions, that i's marginal revenue is
diminishing in both i's output and j's output, hold.
Recall that in the paper it was argued that an increase in the
number of firms operating in country i makes i's aggregate, output
reaction function more elastic. This is a consequence of the quadratic
structure of the model. It is not possible to sign the resulting change
in the slope of i's reaction function as the number of firms operating
in country i increases, for more general demand and cost structures,
because these effects depend on third derivative properties of demand
and cost. However, it is evident that when a large number of firms
operate in country i, the aggregate, output reaction function coincides,
more or less, with the competitive reaction function. Thus, the
desired relation between the number of firms operating in country i and
the elasticity of the aggregate, output reaction function must hold over
some range, under standard assumptions governing demand and cost. The
conclusions of my model are valid in a more general framework, when
attention is restricted to this range.
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